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ABSTRACT
Although farmers in developing countries are generally thought to be risk averse, little is known about the actual form 
of their risk preferences. In this paper, we use a relatively large field experiment to explore risk preferences related to 
sweet potato production among a sample of farmers in northern Mozambique. We explicitly test whether preferences 
follow the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function and whether farmers follow expected utility theory 
or rank dependent utility theory in generating their preferences. We find that we can reject the null that farmers’ 
preferences follow the CRRA utility function in favor of the more flexible power risk aversion preferences. In a mixture 
model, we find that about three-fourths of farmers in our sample develop risk preferences by rank dependent utility. 
We also find that by making the common CRRA assumption in our sample, we poorly predict risk preferences among 
those who are less risk averse.
* Alan de Brauw is a senior research fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute; Patrick Eozenou is a 
post-doctoral fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute. Please direct correspondence to Alan de Brauw 
(a.debrauw@cgiar.org).CoNTeNTS
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Although it is generally assumed that farmers in rural 
areas of developing countries are risk averse, little is 
known about the actual form of their risk preferences. 
When economists attempt to measure risk preferences, 
they typically assume that risk preferences follow 
the constant relative risk assumption (CRRA) utility 
function (see Cardenas and Carpenter (2008) or Hurley 
(2010) for recent reviews of the literature). However, 
the consequences of simply making this assumption 
without testing it are unclear. Few studies actually test 
risk preferences in the field without making the CRRA 
assumption. An important exception is Holt and Laury 
(2002) who consider a more flexible parameterization of 
the utility function, although they do so in a laboratory 
experiment setting. 
Furthermore, it is likely that risk preferences among 
farmers in developing countries are important constraints 
that keep farmers from reaching their productive 
potential. Smallholders in developing countries face 
risk at several points in the production process. Dercon 
and Christiaensen (2011) explicitly show that Ethiopian 
farmers are constrained in technology adoption by risk. 
Furthermore, Boucher et al. (2008) argue theoretically 
that a class of farmers is risk rationed in Peru; that is, 
due to risk, some farmers will not try to access the formal 
credit market, even if it would raise their productivity and 
income levels. Overcoming such barriers to risk, then, 
could help farmers in developing countries improve their 
livelihoods along several dimensions. 
Understanding the heterogeneity of risk preferences and 
the implications of making specific assumptions about 
the form of risk preferences may have consequences as 
programs are designed to help farmers in developing 
countries overcome several different potential sources of 
risk. For example, in several countries, weather insurance 
pilot projects have begun (e.g., Giné and Yang 2009; 
Hill and Viceisza 2010). However, such projects may be 
unsuccessful without a proper understanding of the risk 
preferences of farmers. Additional information about the 
type and distribution of risk preferences among farmers 
can be important information in informing intervention 
design. 
In this paper, we use experimental data collected in 
rural Mozambique to elicit risk preferences of farmers 
participating in an agricultural program that promoted 
orange-fleshed sweet potatoes (OFSP). The data were 
collected in the final survey of a randomized evaluation 
of an intervention that provided farmers with OFSP 
vines and information on how to grow OFSP and the 
relative nutritional benefits of consuming orange rather 
than white sweet potatoes, particularly for women of 
childbearing age and children under five years old. 
The experiment to elicit risk preferences was framed 
around the adoption of sweet potato varieties and 
consisted of presenting a menu of ordered lottery choices 
over hypothetical gains to the farmers. The experiment 
was conducted with 682 farmers. We used the data to 
consider and test several models of risk preferences 
against one another. We initially compared two 
contending models of choice under uncertainty, Expected 
Utility Theory (EUT) and Rank Dependent Utility (RDU). 
We then considered a general class of value functions 
that explicitly allows for variation in relative risk aversion, 
extending the assumption of constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA) that is often made in the literature. 
Our primary contribution to the literature is that we used 
experimental data collected in the field to nest different 
potential models of risk preferences, and we developed 
and tested these models against one another. We further 
constructed a model that allows for heterogeneity in 
the theoretical basis for risk preferences—namely, EUT 
or RDU. In general, we found that the RDU dominates 
EUT, and we generally reject the CRRA hypothesis, 
regardless of the form of preferences. We then showed 
the magnitude of errors that takes place if one assumes 
CRRA preferences. We found that farmers who are less 
risk averse are more susceptible to mischaracterization 
under the CRRA assumption than more risk-averse 
farmers, based on the results of our model. 
The paper will proceed as follows. The next section 
will discuss the literature on the measurement of 
risk preferences, both in the laboratory and in field 
experiments. The third section describes the setting in 
which the data collection and field experiment took place, 
as well as more details about the data collection effort 
and field experiment. The fourth section presents and 
discusses the results, and the final section concludes.
II. MeASuRINg RISk PReFeReNCeS IN 
develoPINg CouNTRIeS
A large body of literature characterizes risk preferences 
among residents of developing countries. In most cases, 
the EUT is used as a conceptual framework to frame risk 
preferences; although more recently, some authors have 
also considered alternative utility frameworks for choice 
under uncertainty. Previous work on the characterization 
of risk preferences has been based on either the use 
of experimental lotteries or the analysis of production 
decisions collected from household survey data. We 
will focus on the first line of work since this paper also 
1 See Hurley (2010) for a recent and more exhaustive review.2
uses experimental lottery data from the field. Here, we 
only summarize papers that are directly relevant to our 
analysis.
Binswanger (1980, 1981)’s studies are among the first 
to provide formal tests of risk aversion among farmers 
in a developing country. The papers describe both 
hypothetical and real payoff lotteries to Indian farmers 
in which the outcome probabilities were fixed, but the 
payoffs of the lotteries varied. These studies found 
that most Indian farmers in the study were risk averse 
and that the degree of risk aversion increased with the 
monetary payoff of the lotteries. Overall, these results 
suggest that farmers’ choices were consistent with 
increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA) and decreasing 
absolute risk aversion (DARA).
Using similar procedures, Miyata (2003) and Wik et 
al. (2004) studied Indonesian and Zambian villagers, 
respectively. Confirming Binswanger (1980, 1981)’s 
findings, they also found that farmers preferences are 
characterized by extreme to moderate degrees of risk 
aversion, by DARA, and by nonincreasing or decreasing 
relative risk aversion.
Mosley and Verschoor (2005) studied three different 
countries (Ethiopia, India, and Uganda) and combined 
choices over lottery pairs with hypothetical certainty 
equivalent questions. Similar to Binswanger (1980, 
1981), they found no significant relationship between risk 
aversion and respondents characteristics such as age, 
gender, literacy, income, or wealth. Responses obtained 
from the hypothetical certainty equivalent questions, 
however, do correlate significantly with the data collected 
through real payoff lottery choices. Contrary to results 
found by other authors, Yesuf and Bluffstone (2009) used 
a dataset collected in northern Ethiopia and found that 
risk aversion is significantly correlated with respondents’ 
characteristics, such as household composition, income, 
and wealth.
Hill (2009) relied on stated preferences and beliefs to 
identify the effect of risk aversion on production decisions 
for a sample of Ugandan coffee growers. Using both 
nonparametric and regression analysis, she found that 
higher risk aversion translates into a lower allocation 
of labor toward a risky perennial crop such as coffee. 
This effect dissipates among wealthier farmers. This 
result underscores the importance of understanding risk 
preferences for measuring specific farmer-level outcomes. 
More recently, Liu (2008), Tanaka et al. (2010), and 
Harrison et al. (2010) departed from the previously 
cited work in that they considered an alternative utility 
framework to EUT by considering Prospect Theory (PT) or 
RDU models. These studies also contrast with previous 
work in the way lottery choices are elicited. Instead of 
fixing the outcome probabilities and varying the lottery 
stakes (as was proposed by Binswanger (1980)), they 
followed Holt and Laury (2002) and used multiple 
price lotteries (MPL) where the lottery payoffs are fixed 
in each choice task, and the outcome probabilities 
are varied. While Liu (2008) and Tanaka et al. (2010) 
analyzed the PT framework over the full range of gains 
and losses, Harrison et al. (2010) focused on the gain 
domain only, and they compared EUT to RDU by testing 
study country lottery type Perception 
Framework
utility Function
Binswanger (1981)  India Hypothetical and 
real
EUT CRRA
Holt and Laury (2002)  USA Hypothetical and 
real
EUT CRRA and Power
Miyata (2003)  Indonesia Real EUT CRRA
Wik et al. (2004)  Zambia Real EUT CRRA







Liu (2008)  China Real EUT and CPT CRRA
Hill (2009)  Uganda Hypothetical EUT CRRA
Yesuf and Bluffstone 
(2009) 
Ethiopia Real EUT CRRA
Tanaka et al. (2010)  Vietnam Real EUT and CPT CRRA
Harrison et al. (2010)  Ethiopia, India, 
Uganda
Real EUT and RDU CRRA
table 1: Risk Preferences, Perception Framework, and utility Functions3
the nonlinearity of the probability weighting function. 
Harrison et al. (2010) also estimated finite mixture 
models, allowing both EUT and RDU to explain some 
proportion of respondents’ choices over risky lotteries. 
In this paper, we extend Harrison et al. (2010) by relaxing 
the CRRA assumption in the utility function, while also 
estimating a finite mixture model.
In Table 1 we summarize some essential characteristics of 
the work cited above. As can be seen in this table, most 
of the previously mentioned studies relied exclusively 
on CRRA utility functions to compute coefficients of 
relative risk aversion. Under EUT, CRRA utility functions 
are convenient to work with because they summarize 
attitudes toward risk in a single parameter that is related 
to the curvature of the utility function. This simplicity 
in the functional form comes at the cost of generality 
since there is no reason to believe a-priori that risk 
attitudes should be characterized by increasing relative 
risk aversion. Holt and Laury (2002)’s research using US 
students’ responses from laboratory experiments is the 
only work we are aware of in this literature that relaxes 
the CRRA assumption. They notice that respondents’ 
choices are actually more consistent with IRRA than with 
CRRA, so they consider a power utility function allowing 
the relative risk aversion coefficient to be decreasing, 
constant, or increasing. In this paper, we build on 
the previous literature by considering a general utility 
specification, which allows us to test altogether EUT 
against RDU and CRRA against a more general valuation 
function.
III. THe FIeld exPeRIMeNT
The field experiment we discuss was conducted as 
part of the final survey in the impact evaluation of 
the HarvestPlus Reaching End Users (REU) project 
in Zambézia Province of northern Mozambique. The 
REU was an integrated biofortification project with the 
goal of reducing vitamin A deficiency among young 
children and women of childbearing age. Vitamin A was 
introduced through OFSP; vines were distributed to 
households at the beginning of the project and annually 
thereafter. The project then worked to increase adoption 
and consumption of OFSP by combining agricultural 
extension on OFSP cultivation and propagation, nutrition 
education on the health benefits of vitamin A-rich OFSP, 
and a marketing component.
III.1 the Reu Project in Zambézia
The REU project took place between 2006 and 2009 in 
four districts of Zambézia (Figure 1). The program was 
implemented within farmers’ groups in 144 communities 
in Milange, Gurué, Mopeia, and Nicoadala districts of 
Zambézia. Because existing community organizations 
are quite scarce in Mozambique, the project worked with 
communities to identify existing organizations, usually 
church groups, and then expanded or combined groups 
to include roughly 100 farmers on average.2 The project 
ran for three growing seasons, from the 2006–2007 
season to the 2008–2009 season. 
The impact evaluation was designed in collaboration with 
the implementing agencies. Prior to the intervention, 
a set of communities was randomly divided into three 
groups: an intensive treatment group (Model 1), a less 
intensive treatment group (Model 2), and a control 
group. Randomization took place within three strata, 
Milange district, Gurué district, and two southern 
districts (Mopeia and Nicoadala, referred to in this paper 
as the South), to ensure that regional or language effects 
would not dominate any estimated impacts. The sample 
for this paper was collected in all three strata. 
III.2 data collection
It is Important to note that the impact evaluation 
collected socioeconomic data prior to implementation 
of the REU in October and November of 2006 and in 
mid-2009 after the REU had been implemented for three 
seasons. The socioeconomic surveys elicited information 
about: household demographics and human capital, 
production of sweet potatoes and other crops, food and 
nonfood consumption and expenditures, assets, and 
shocks. The 2009 survey returned to exactly the same 
households as were interviewed in 2006, so we can 
match information about the individuals and households 
participating in the experiment prior to the intervention 
with data from the risk perception experiment detailed 
below. We report descriptive statistics for the sample in 
Table 2. 
2 More details on the project and site selection are available in de Brauw et al. 
(2010).
Figure 1: survey location Maps4
III.3 the Risk Perception experiment
Following Holt and Laury (2002), we designed a 
hypothetical experiment to elicit the attitudes of the 
respondents toward uncertainty specifically related 
to sweet potato production. A subsample of 439 
households was randomly selected from the overall 
sample to participate in this experiment. Whenever 
possible, we tried to perform the experiment on both the 
household head and the spouse. For 243 households, 
two respondents were available for the interview; in all 
of these cases, respondents were separated to avoid 
one influencing the other’s responses. In all other cases, 
either a spouse did not exist, or the spouse was not 
present. Overall, a total of 682 respondents participated 
in the experiment and made choices from a menu of 
ordered lotteries. In the experiment, the respondent was 
asked to choose between two varieties of sweet potatoes. 
One of these varieties (variety A) would yield a higher 
P(A1) A1 P(A2) A2 P(B1) B1 P(B2) B2 E[A] E[B] E[A] – E[B]
0.1 50 0.9 40 0.1 95 0.9 5 8.2 3.8 4.4
0.2 50 0.8 40 0.2 95 0.8 5 8.4 5.6 2.8
0.3 50 0.7 40 0.3 95 0.7 5 8.6 7.4 1.2
0.4 50 0.6 40 0.4 95 0.6 5 8.8 9.2 -0.4
0.5 50 0.5 40 0.5 95 0.5 5 9.0 11.0 -2.0
0.6 50 0.4 40 0.6 95 0.4 5 9.2 12.8 -3.6
0.7 50 0.3 40 0.7 95 0.3 5 9.4 14.6 -5.2
0.8 50 0.2 40 0.8 95 0.2 5 9.6 16.4 -6.8
0.9 50 0.1 40 0.9 95 0.1 5 9.8 18.2 -8.4
1.0 50 0.0 40 1.0 95 0.0 5 10 20 -10
table 3: Payoff Matrix
n = 682 All Male Female
Stick to A (safe choice) 69 31 38
Stick to B (risky choice) 26 11 15
Shift once from A to B 587 223 364
Shift more than once 1 0 1
table 4: Pattern of Responses by gender
sample Mean std. dev.
Gender (% male respondents)  38.8 48.8
% of respondents below 30 35.6 47.9
% of respondents above 50 4.5 20.8
% of respondents in Milange 57.6 49.4
% respondents in Gurue 23.9 42.7
% responents in South 18.5 18.5
% who can speak Portuguese 49.6 50.0
% with wage earner in household 24.5 43.0
% with experience in sweet potato (> 5 years) 87.7 32.9
Total food expenditures per capita per day (USD) 0.27 0.13
% Reporting severe income shock 6.3 24.3
% Reporting severe asset shock 3.3 18.0
# enumerators 10 -
table 2: summary statistics5
output (50 50-kg bags per acre) under good rainfall 
conditions but a slightly lower output (40 50-kg bags per 
acre) under bad rainfall conditions. The other variety (B) 
had more variable hypothetical yields. With good rainfall, 
yields were quite high (95 50-kg bags per acre), but with 
poor rainfall, the yield would be quite low (5 50-kg per 
acre). The respondent had to make choices between 
these two varieties under 10 different rainfall scenarios, as 
the probability of good rainfall gradually increased from 
10 percent to 100 percent. We include the protocol for the 
experiment, translated into English, in the Appendix.
For each distinct probability of good rainfall, the 
respondent was asked to choose between variety A, a less 
risky variety of sweet potato, and variety B, a more risky 
variety (Table 3). The net expected value of each choice 
task (not shown to the respondent) is computed as 
where for each variety (A or B), s = 1 indicates the more 
favorable state of nature, i.e., good rainfall, and s = 2 
indicates the less favorable scenario, i.e., poor rainfall and 
therefore lower sweet potato yields. As observed in Table 
3, the expected payoff for variety B was higher than variety 
A for all probabilities of good rainfall of 40 percent and 
above.
We next examine response patterns by gender (Table 
4). The majority of respondents (86 percent) began 
the experiment by choosing the safer variety (A) under 
unfavorable rainfall scenarios and then shifted to the 
more risky variety (B) as the probability of experiencing 
good rainfall increased. A minority of respondents (10 
percent) chose the safe variety throughout all rainfall 
scenarios, even when presented with certainty of good 
rainfall. Fewer respondents chose the risky variety from 
beginning to end (4 percent), while only one respondent 
chose to change her preferred variety more than once. As 
a result, it is clear that almost all respondents understood 
the experiment quite well.
We next compare the average choices by respondents 
with the risk neutral choices (Figure 2) by reporting the 
proportion of respondents that chose the safer variety, 
variety A, by the probability of experiencing good rainfall 
in the experiment. We note that the proportion of risky 
variety choices increases monotonically as the probability 
of experiencing good rainfall increases. However, it does 
so at a substantially slower rate than would be expected 
if all respondents were risk neutral. Therefore, we can 
conclude that at least with respect to sweet potato 
varieties, the average farmer in our sample is risk averse.
Although we can conclude that, on average, our sample 
is risk averse, we have not yet characterized preferences 
theoretically. We present a standard conceptual 
framework about choice under uncertainty in the next 
section. The standard framework will be the basis of our 
empirical analysis of risk attitudes.
Iv. MeTHodology ANd ReSulTS
Iv.1 Methodology
Iv.1.1 conceptual Framework
We assume that utility U (∑j ω (pj) xj) = ∑j  ω (pj) U (xj) is 
formed over risky lottery outcomes xj, j Є {1,2}, weighted 
by their subjective probability of occurrence ω (pj) with 
pj ≥ 0 and ∑ ω (pj) = 1. In this paper, the lotteries are 
related to choices of sweet potato varieties with different 
yields under alternative rainfall scenarios. Therefore, we 
restrict our attention to the gain domain, i.e., xj > 0.
Under Expected Utility Theory (EUT) (Bernoulli 1738; 
von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944), the subjective 
probabilities are identical to the objective probabilities, 
and the probability weighting function is thus defined 
by ω (pj) = pj. In this case, the most commonly adopted 
measures of risk aversion are given by the coefficient 
of absolute risk aversion ARA(x) = –       , or by the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion RRA(x) = x ARA(x) 
(Pratt 1964; Arrow 1965).
Quiggin (1982, 1993) has proposed a Rank Dependent 
Utility (RDU) framework that can be seen as a 
generalization of EUT. Under RDU, subjective 
probabilities are not constrained to be equal to objective 
probabilities as in EUT. Instead, agents are allowed to 
make their choices under uncertainty according to a 
nonlinear probability weighting function. Under this 
framework, the extent to which agents are risk averse is 
not only captured by some measure of the curvature of 






























































10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Probability of Experiencing Good Rainfall (%)
Risk Neutral Choices Actual Respondents Choices
N = 682
Mozambique, 2009
Hypothetical Risk Experiment Responses
Figure 2: Risk experiment Responses6
the utility function (such as ARA(x) or RRA(x)) but also 
by the nonlinearity of the probability weighting function. 
We will consider both theoretical approaches.3
In this paper, we assess the extent to which the choices 
made by the respondents are consistent with EUT by 
testing, whether or not the probability weighting function 
is linear. We also look at different nested specifications 
of the valuation function U(.), and this allows us to 
determine the shape of risk preferences, which is more 
consistent with the data.
Iv.1.2 utility Functions
Power Risk Aversion Utility We start by considering a 
general parameterization of the utility function that 
allows RRA(x) to be decreasing, increasing, or constant. 
A parsimonious specification allowing such degree of 
generality is proposed by Xie (2000) with the Power 
Risk Aversion (PRA) utility function. The PRA valuation 
function is given by 
The coefficient of absolute risk aversion is now 
nonincreasing in x and given by
while the coefficient of relative risk aversion can be 
written as
Constant Relative Risk Aversion Utility When γ = 0, the 
PRA reduces to the CRRA utility function, which is the 
most commonly assumed specification in studies of risk 
aversion. It can be written as:
Under this parameterization, the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion is equal to σ, and the coefficient of absolute 
risk aversion is assumed to be decreasing  
(ARACRRA (x) = σ/x).
Iv.1.3 Regression model
We assume that farmers in our sample choose the sweet 
potato varieties that deliver the highest expected utility 
under each rainfall scenario. This setup is similar to a 
random utility model where  are unobserved 
single period utility levels associated with the choice 
of variety A and B. For any given rainfall scenario, we 
assume that the difference  is a latent 
variable that depends on a set of explanatory variables X 
and on parameters σ, γ, μ, β. More specifically, we assume 
that
where s = 1, 2 denotes the bad rainfall/good rainfall 
states, j = A, B is the index for the two varieties of sweet 
potato, and 1[ y* > 0] is an indicator function equal to 1 
if y* > 0 and 0 otherwise. We include a set of explanatory 
X variables to control for observable heterogeneity in σ, 
which is the coefficient of relative risk aversion under the 
CRRA utility. This approach is similar to the estimation 
of a random parameter model where the estimated 
parameter σ ̂is assumed to vary across observations 
according to σ ̂i = f (Xi β) = α + βXi+ ui where ui~N (0, 
1). The variable yA represents the choice of variety 
A, and σ, γ, μ, β are the parameters to be estimated. 
In equation (8), we assume that the error term ε is 
normally distributed with variance 1 and is identically 
and independently distributed between respondents. 
However, when we estimate parameters, we allow choices 
to be correlated within respondents.
The likelihood function for the discrete choice model 
described in equations (5) through (9) is:
where Ф(.) is the cumulative standard normal 
distribution. We obtain estimates of the parameters by 
maximizing the logarithm of equation (10).
Iv.1.4 Finite Mixture Model
Following Harrison et al. (2010), we also estimate a 
mixture model where we allow both EUT and RDU 
to explain observed choices under uncertainty by 
Mozambican farmers. The likelihood function for this 
model is given by
∆U* = U* – U* A A B
UPRA (x) =       1 – exp  –γ   {
1
γ ((
x 1– σ – 1






RRAPRA (x) = σ + γx 1–σ (3)
UCRRA (x) = 
x 1–σ – 1
1–σ (4)
Uj = ∑ ω (psj) U (ysj ; σ,γ)
μ ω (psj) = psj / [ psj + (1–psj)μ]1/μ μ
∆U* = U* – U* = f (X; σ,γ,μ,β) + ε  A B
ε ~ N (0,1)







L (σ, γ, μ, β | Xi, yAi) =       [Ф (∆U*




x [1 – Ф (ΔU* (Xi; σi, γ, μ, β))]
1 – yAi
(10)
3 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) further 
generalize EUT by assuming that subjective and objective probabilities are not 
identical, as in RDU, but also by assuming that the way agents valorize risky 
lotteries varies according to whether the outcomes of the lotteries lie in the 
loss or in the gain domain (Cumulative prospect Theory, or CPT). Since our 
experiment is restricted to the gain domain by design (sweet potato yields are 
defined only over the gain domain), we cannot empirically test whether EUT or 
RDU hold against CPT.
∆U* = U* – U* A A B ∆U* = U* – U* A A B and7




x (1 – π) [1 – Ф (ΔURDU (Xi; σi, γ, μ, β))]
1 – yAi *
*
(11)
table 5: Regression Results
PRA CRRA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
σ 0.33*** 0.41* 0.45** 0.74*** 0.83*** 0.92***
(0.05) (0.25) (0.21) (0.01) (0.10) (0.13)
Male 0.09 0.01 -0.05 0.03
(0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Age < 30 0.13** 0.14** 0.04 0.00
(0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03)
Age > 50 0.10 0.00 -0.06 -0.11*
(0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
Gurue District -0.16 -0.13 -0.14*** -0.11*
(0.15) (0.12) (0.05) (0.07)
South District 0.17* 0.28** 0.08 0.14*
(0.10) (0.13) (0.06) (0.08)
Education (Speaks Portuguese) -0.06 -0.55* -0.02 -0.02
(0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Wage in Household -0.10 -0.09 -0.03 0.06
(0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03)
Experience with Sweet Potato (>5 years) -0.04 -0.05 0.02 -0.07
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
Total Food Expenditure per Capita -0.09 -0.13** 0.03 0.03
(0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
Severe Shock to Income 0.19 0.15 0.09 0.06
(0.13) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07)
Severe Shock to Assets 0.11 -0.07 0.07 0.10
(0.15) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
Village and Enumerator Dummies No No Yes No No Yes
μ 1.37*** 1.24*** 1.22*** 1.15*** 1.13*** 1.08***
(0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
F – stat (H0 : μ = 1) 42.3*** 5.20** 6.30*** 75.10*** 48.44*** 36.00***
p – value (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
γ 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.09*** – – –
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
N 6820 5700 5700 6820 5700 5700
Log-Likelihood -2867.6 -2346.1 -2195.5 -2916.9 -2371.2 -2233.2
Maximum likelihood estimates. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
where π is the parameter determining the proportion of 
respondents behaving according to EUT (μ=1).
Iv.2 Results
Iv.2.1 Homogenous Preferences
We want to learn about which form of risk preferences 
best characterizes the preferences of farmers in our 
sample, with respect to the two hypothetical varieties 
of sweet potatoes posed to them. Since RDU is a 
generalization of EUT over the gain domain and since the 8
CRRA form is a special case of the PRA utility function, all 
the specifications considered here are nested within the 
PRA utility function under the RDU framework.4
We begin by estimating the model described by equations 
(5) through (9) (Table 5). We initially estimate a general 
model in which the parameters are common across 
respondents (column 1). The two parameters of the PRA 
utility function (1) are positive and significantly different 
from zero: σ ̂= 0.33 and γ ̂= 0.16. Recall that the parameter 
γ represents the difference between the PRA and the 
CRRA; if γ = 0, then PRA preferences collapse to CRRA 
preferences. As we can reject the null hypothesis that if  
γ ̂= 0 at the 1 percent significance level, we conclude that 
preferences do not, on average, follow the CRRA in favor 
of PRA preferences.
Constant relative risk aversion is a convenient 
assumption to impose because of the simplicity of the 
implied utility function. Under CRRA utility, relative risk 
aversion (and the curvature of the utility function) is 
summarized in only one parameter (σ). Under PRA utility, 
however, the coefficient of relative risk aversion is now 
determined by two parameters, σ and γ, each of which 
influences the curvature of the utility function. We depict 
the relative influence of these two parameters on the 
shape of the utility function in Figure 3 by plotting the 
utility function for different values of σ and γ at estimated 
parameter values. With this set of parameter values, we 
observe that absolute risk aversion (2) is decreasing, but 
relative risk aversion (3) is increasing. We demonstrate 
this point in Figure 4, which illustrates that relative risk 
aversion is increasing for all values of X at the estimates’ 
parameter values.
A further parameter of interest is μ, which describes 
the shape of the relationship between the objective 
probabilities of the two states A and B and the subjective 
probabilities assigned to those states by the respondent 
(equation 6). Note that EUT is consistent with μ = 1, and 
equation (6) collapses to ω (p) = p if μ = 1. Therefore, 
in this framework, we can test the null hypothesis that 
μ = 1 against the alternative that it is not (μ ≠ 1), which is 
equivalent to testing the null hypothesis that preferences 
behave as in EUT against the alternative that preferences 
follow the RDU. 
We report the F – statistic of this hypothesis test in 
Table 5, and in all specifications, we strongly reject EUT 
in favor of RDU. Since we find that μ ̂> 1 under each 
specification, the respondents’ probability weighting 
function is S-shaped. Respondents tend, therefore, to 
underweight small probabilities relative to the objective 
and overweight larger probabilities. In the top graph in 
Figure 4, we plot the nonlinear probability weighting 
function against the identity function that is imposed 
if we assume EUT. Note that only around a probability 
of the good rainfall state of 0.6 do farmers begin to 
overweight subjective probabilities; before that point, they 
underweight objective probabilities.
We also model σ as a function of observable 
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Figure 3: Power Risk Aversion utility Function
















Figure 4: Absolute and Relative Risk Aversion  
[(μ, γ, σ) = (1, 0.16, 0.33)]
4 In our specification, (6) implies that the valuation function is consistent with 
EUT only if μ=1.9
characteristics about respondents (Table 5, columns 
2–3 and 5–6). We focus on measuring σ as a function 
of observables rather than γ, specifically so that we can 
compare the effect of observables on the curvature of 
both the CRRA and PRA utility functions. We include 
variables measured in the baseline socioeconomic survey, 
including the age, gender, and education level of the 
respondent, total household expenditures, and previous 
household experience with growing sweet potatoes. 
Moreover, we include contemporaneous variables 
capturing self-reported shocks to income and asset 
holdings in the past 12 months, as well as an indicator 
of whether a member of the household is a wage earner. 
Finally, we include village-dummy variables to account 
for community-specific characteristics like agroecological 
conditions, for example, and we control for enumerator 
effects during the interview.
For PRA preferences, the conditional estimates are 
reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table 5.5 We find that only 
a few variables have a statistically significant influence 
on risk aversion. For example, the estimated coefficient 
among younger respondents (less than 30 years old) 
suggests that they are more risk averse than respondents 
age 30 to 50. The gender of the respondent does not 
appear to influence risk aversion. Moreover, we find 
that respondents located in the southern districts of 
Zambézia are also more averse to risks related to sweet 
potato yields. In the southern districts, farmers prefer 
to plant sweet potato after they harvest the primary rice 
crop, so the sweet potato growing season is shorter. As 
a result, farmers could be more risk averse, particularly 
with respect to poor rainfall, due to the short season. 
Respondents who experienced shocks to income or 
assets in 2009 do not seem to answer differently than 
respondents who did not experience such shocks. After 
taking into account village and enumerator effects, higher 
education and higher level of food expenditures are also 
associated with lower risk aversion. Finally, it is important 
to note that including control variables to condition σ 
does not alter the main results. Even when controlling for 
individual and household characteristics, we still reject 
CRRA in favor of PRA (γ ̂≠ 0), and we still reject EUT in 
favor of RDU (μ ̂≠ 1).
An open question is how badly one predicts risk 
preferences if using the common assumption of CRRA 
preferences. First, we predict the distribution of relative 
risk aversion under the PRA and CRRA utility functions, 
conditioning on individual and household characteristics 
(Figure 5). We find that under the PRA, individuals are 
predicted to be more risk averse, though the variation in 
relative risk aversion is larger. Yet it could be that the two 
utility functions predict essentially the same relative risk 
ranking. To measure this, we assigned the predictions 
under both utility functions into deciles, with relative 
risk aversion increasing by decile rank. We then plotted 





















































































Figure 6: Bubble Plot for RRA (x) distribution of  
PRA vs cRRA
5 Information on total food expenditure was not collected for a small part of our 
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Figure 5: estimated σ distribution for PRA and cRRA10
farmers by PRA decile on the y-axis and by CRRA decile 
on the x-axis in a bubble plot, where the size of the bubble 
represents the number of farmers falling into each decile 
cell (Figure 6). If PRA and CRRA preferences ranked 
farmers similarly, we would find 10 large bubbles along 
the 45 degree line. Instead, we find a significant number 
of farmers who fall into different deciles under PRA 
preferences than under CRRA preferences, as evidenced 
by the size and number of bubbles off of the 45 degree 
line. If one assumes CRRA, a similar group of farmers are 
the most risk averse as under PRA preferences, but as 
farmers are predicted to be less risk averse, the rankings 
diverge. In fact, many of the farmers characterized as 
in the least risk-averse decile under CRRA end up in 
the second decile under PRA, and the least risk-averse 
farmers under PRA are found in every decile up to the 
7th under CRRA preferences. In general, the figure 
indicates that if we had made the CRRA assumption, the 
relative ranking of risk aversion among farmers in our 
sample would be dramatically different than under PRA 
preferences. If we remain conservative and consider that 
our estimated σ coefficients classified +/- 1 decile apart 
are similar, we still find that close to 33 percent of farmers 
are misclassified under CRRA parameter estimates 
relative to PRA parameters.
Iv.2.2 Preference Heterogeneity
In the previous subsection, we imposed a single utility 
framework on the data (either EUT or RDU). We next relax 
this assumption by allowing a proportion of farmers to 
respond according to EUT and the remaining farmers 
to respond according to RDU. Harrison and Rutström 
(2009) and Harrison et al. (2010) have recently shown 
that preference heterogeneity is potentially a relevant 
factor to account for in experimental data related to risk 
attitudes. Therefore, we base the next set of results on the 
likelihood function in equation (11), which is similar in 
spirit to a regime switching model. 
Among our sample, neither EUT nor RDU fully explains 
observed attitudes toward risk related to sweet potato 
yields in Zambézia (Table 6). We find that the estimated 
parameter on the share of farmers behaving according 
to EUT is significantly different from zero (28 percent). 
However, the percentage is not large; the majority of 
farmers still behave according to RDU according to the 
finite mixture model (72 percent).
Interestingly, by relaxing the assumption made on 
homogenous preferences, the way RDU farmers discount 
objective probabilities changes. The estimated parameter 
characterizing the probability weighting function is 
now μ ̂= 0.57, which implies that RDU farmers actually 
over-weight small probabilities and under-weight larger 
probabilities. This finding is more consistent with 
typical weighting functions from RDU, so estimating 
risk preferences in a mixture model appears to be more 
realistic.
v. CoNCluSIoN
In this paper, we have used experimental data that was 
collected in combination with data from an impact 
evaluation of an agricultural biofortification intervention 
that used OFSP as the delivery mechanism for additional 
vitamin A. As the intervention involved growing OFSP, we 
framed our experiment around growing sweet potatoes. 
We conducted the experiment among a subsample of 
farm households (682 respondents) included in the final 
impact evaluation survey.














Maximum likelihood estimates. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respec-
tively.11
When we estimated risk preferences in a general form 
that nested more restrictive forms of preferences 
typically used in the literature, we found that we could 
strongly reject the hypotheses that farmers follow CRRA 
preferences. We also found that by averaging across 
the whole sample, we could reject the null hypothesis 
that preferences follow EUT, accepting the alternative 
hypothesis that preferences follow RDU. We also 
estimated the proportion of farmers whose preferences 
follow EUT by estimating a mixture model; the point 
estimate was 0.278, suggesting that for about one-fourth 
of farmers, the objective probabilities of states coincide 
with their subjective probabilities.
We finally demonstrated how the assumptions of CRRA 
preferences affect the characterization of risk preferences. 
Relative to PRA preferences, CRRA preferences do 
reasonably well at describing the preferences of more 
risk-averse farmers but appear to poorly describe the risk 
preferences of less risk-averse farmers. Therefore, making 
the CRRA assumption is not without cost; more flexible 
forms of risk preferences certainly lead to a different 
ranking of individuals with respect to risk aversion, at 
worst badly mischaracterizing risk preferences among 
sampled individuals.
Therefore, we suggest that researchers use caution before 
making the CRRA assumption in empirical applications. 
One potential concern with our application, however, is 
that we asked about risk preferences in a narrowly defined 
hypothetical context and that risk preferences in growing 
sweet potatoes might be different than in other contexts. 
We believe that it might be worthwhile to replicate this 
analysis with an experiment that either more broadly 
defines the risk domain, includes real payouts, or both.12
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APPeNdIx
RISK PERCEPTIONS MODULE
Enumerator: Read the introduction to all participants in a group, but take each respondent aside to ask them 
individually what their choices are. Please try to ensure that respondents do not observe others’ responses. 
Introduction: “Scientists are working to find varieties of sweet potato that are better than what you are used to at 
present. The following choices are hypothetical but can help provide some input to their research. Assume there are 
two varieties being planned that have different yield potential depending on how much it rains. Below you will make 
10 choices between the two varieties, Variety A and Variety B, under different situations about possible rainfall. When 
making your choices, assume you have access to one acre of land on which to plant one of the new varieties. Both 
varieties would fetch the same price in the market, so they only differ in the possible yields. For each of the following 
10 cases, please tell us whether you would prefer variety A or variety B in each case. All yields are measured in units 
of 50 kg bags. Once again, the two varieties only differ in how they perform under different rainfall conditions. Variety 
B performs extremely well under very good rainfall conditions, yielding 95 bags. But it does not perform that well 
if rainfall is moderate; with moderate rainfall, Variety B yields only 5 bags. On the other hand, Variety A gives more 
consistent yields: if there is very good rainfall, it yields 50 bags, and if there is moderate rainfall, it will yield 40 bags. 
So Variety B is more risky than Variety A. Again, if there is very good rainfall, Variety B will yield 95 bags while Variety 
A will yield 50 bags. If there is moderate rainfall, Variety B will yield only 5 bags, while Variety A will yield 40 bags. 
Variety B is good as long as rainfall is good, but it is risky. Variety A gives more moderate yields irrespective of the rain 
received. Do you understand?
We will ask you now, individually, to please tell us which variety you would prefer under different situations where the 
chance of very good rainfall is increasing from 10% to 100%. So we will ask you: if the chance of very good rainfall is 
1 out of 10 and that of moderate rainfall is 9 out of 10, which variety would you choose? And we will keep changing 
the chance of very good rainfall. So then we will ask if you if the chance of good rainfall is now two out of ten, and the 
chance of moderate rainfall is 8 of 10, what would you choose? And so on. We will ask you ten questions changing the 
chance of good rainfall from 1 out of 10 to 10 out of 10 and ask your preference in each case. These are all hypothetical 
choices, and there are no right or wrong answers. One way to understand what is meant by the chance of very good 
rainfall is to think of weather forecasts. When the weather forecasters make a prediction, they are not certain of the 
prediction and say that there is such and such percent chance of rain. This is what we mean by chance of good and 
moderate rainfall. For example, over the next ten-year period, the chance of very good rainfall being 2 out 10 means 
over the next ten year period there is likely to be very good rainfall in 2 years. And so on. 
Please note once again that both varieties would command the same price in the market.”
Enumerator: Please ensure that the respondent understands what is meant by asking them to repeat back to you the 
structure of the choices. Please don’t translate this to say “there will be good/moderate rainfall;” please use “likely to 
be”. You may ask one or two questions to make sure they’ve understood. Writing out the yields for the two varieties 
(on the ground) may be useful. You may want to use sticks to represent five bags and thus demonstrate the 95, 5, 50, 
and 40 bags for those who are not literate. Once you are convinced they’ve understood the set up, you can proceed to 
the choices. A common misunderstanding is to interpret higher chance of rain as higher quantity of rain—this is not 
what is meant here. You can also ask them when they switch, why they switched.
Key messages: There will be 10 choices. One variety is risky, the other is stable—as demonstrated by the yields written 
out. Ask the respondent to explain the question back to you and make sure s/he understands. Then start asking 
the questions and again, please ensure that the two respondents from the household do not observe each other’s 
answers.